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ABSTRACT 
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Industrial Internet devices have faced new threats by attackers with high resources. 
Thus, the cybersecurity of such devices has to improve. Variable-frequency drives 
(VFD) were selected as the target devices to study cybersecurity of industrial internet 
devices and give recommendations of how to improve their cybersecurity. 
The current status of cybersecurity of VFDs was studied in the thesis. The study was 
performed by interviewing product development engineers of a VFD manufacturer. 
VFD’s assets were recognized in the interviews also. Security weaknesses were found 
during the interviews and potential attacks against those weaknesses were also identi-
fied. The attacks were categorized and values were assigned to attack’s effectiveness 
and complexity. The description of attacks included also some hints how the attacks 
could be performed and why attacker might want to perform the operation. Finally the 
attack tree were performed based on the attacks. 
The thesis presented also mitigation strategies which were found from literature. It was 
also presented how the strategies suited for the VFD context. There was a study of what 
mitigation strategies VFD are applying. A prioritisation workshop was organized for 
prioritising the unapplied mitigation strategies. The prioritisation was necessary because 
there was the need to perform important strategies first. The attendees of the workshop 
were product managers, software architect and cybersecurity chief of VFD manufactur-
er. The prioritisation method used was Weighted Shortest Job First. The method noti-
fied business value, time criticality, risk reduction and how much effort the job might 
take to get done. 
The most important mitigation strategy was Access Control. Second important strategy 
was Logging and Event Management. Third important strategy was User Authentication 
and Authorization. A possible explanation for the prioritisation might be that there were 
customer requirements for the strategies. However, the discussion in prioritisation 
workshop cleared the general view of mitigation strategies. Thus, those strategies got 
highest points in the business value, time criticality and risk reduction. 
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Teollisen internetin laitteiden tietoturvaan on alettu kiinnittää enemmän huomiota vasta 
viime vuosina. Laitteiden verkottuminen ja uhkaajien taitotason noustessa teollisen in-
ternetin laitteet tarvitsevat parempaa tietoturvaa. Työssä tutkitaan taajuusmuuttajan tie-
toturvan nykytilaa ja ehdotetaan toimenpiteitä tietoturvan parantamiseen. 
Työssä taajuusmuuttajan tietoturvan nykytila ja potentiaaliset uhkatekijät kartoitettiin 
keskustelemalla taajuusmuuttajia valmistavan yrityksen tuotekehityshenkilöstön kanssa. 
Samalla kävi ilmi taajuusmuuttajan suojaamisen arvoiset voimavarat. 
Tietoturvan nykytilaa kartoittaessa havaittiin taajuusmuuttajassa erilaisia tietoturvalli-
suuden heikkouksia. Heikkouksille löytyi myös erilaisia tapoja hyödyntää niitä hyök-
käysten muodossa. Hyökkäykset kategorisoitiin ja pisteytettiin vaikeusasteen ja vaikut-
tavuuden mukaan. Niistä kuvattiin myös se kuinka niitä olisi mahdollista toteuttaa ja 
miksi hyökkääjä haluaisi hyökätä taajuusmuuttajaa vastaan hyökkäyksen tavalla. Hyök-
käykset koottiin lopulta yhteen ja niistä muodostettiin hyökkäyspuu. 
Työssä esiteltiin myös kirjallisuudesta löytyneitä tietoturvauhkien lievennysstrategioita 
ja mitä ne soveltuvat taajuusmuuttajien kontekstiin. Samalla tutkittiin mitä uhkien lie-
vennysstrategioita taajuusmuuttajassa on jo toteutettuna. Toteuttamattomista strategiois-
ta järjestettiin priorisointityöpaja. Priorisoiminen toteutettiin, jotta taajuusmuuttajien 
turvallisuuden kannalta merkittävimmät strategiat toteutettaisiin ensiksi. Työpajassa oli 
koolla taajuusmuuttaja valmistajan tuotepäälliköitä, ohjelmistoarkkitehti ja taajuusmuut-
tajien tietoturvan kehityksestä vastaava päällikkö. Priorisoinnin tukena käytettiin WSJF-
priorisointimenetelmää (weighted shortest job first), joka huomioi torjuntastrategian lii-
ketoiminta-arvon, aikakriittisyyden, toteuttamatta jättämisen riskin ja strategian toteut-
tamisen työläyden. 
Työpajassa tärkeimmäksi strategiaksi nousi pääsynhallinta. Toiseksi tärkein strategia oli 
lokien kerääminen ja tapahtumien hallinta. Kolmanneksi tärkein strategia oli käyttäjän 
autentikointi ja auktorisointi. Osittain kärkistrategiat selittyvät jo työpajan järjestämis-
hetkellä olevista asiakasvaatimuksista, mutta työpajan ansiosta keskustelu strategioista 
vahvistui ja kyseiset strategiat saivat siten korkeimmat arvot liiketoiminnan, aikakriitti-
syyden ja toteuttamatta jättämisen riskin suhteen. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Number of networked devices is growing in an increasing pace. Devices which did not 
have an access to the internet earlier are connected today. This enables better communi-
cation between devices, remote controlling of devices and collection of data. Which in 
turn can increase productivity of devices. However, networking of devices may present 
threats, for example, a malicious person tries to break devices remotely. Because of this, 
manufacturers have taken steps to increase cybersecurity how the devices detect, ana-
lyze and combat threats.   
The purpose of this thesis is to study what threat mitigation techniques and strategies 
are used to strengthen cybersecurity in Industrial Internet devices. The study is per-
formed as a case study and target of study is Variable-Frequency Drives (VFDs). The 
study focuses on mitigation strategies, which are found from literature, and the applica-
tion of these strategies in VFDs. The thesis also gives recommendations on which of the 
identified strategies should be implemented as a priority in order to keep up with the 
cybersecurity trends. The strategies are prioritised by Weighted Shortest Job First 
(WSJF) method.  
There are also other devices in industrial networks which might cause security issues to 
VFD. An old phrase in security says that “security is only as strong as its weakest link.” 
So, it is impossible to secure any system completely against all attackers (Saitta et al. 
2005). Industrial networks are often considered to be separate from company’s network 
and separate from the internet as well. Recently this has changed and now firewalls are 
required in order to bring protection from the outside world. Historically industrial sys-
tems have been secured by isolating vulnerable components. Thus, networks have been 
guarded by locks and guards, not cybersecurity agents. (IIC, 2016)  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two describes VFD. The chapter 
describes what a VFD is as well as its interfaces and services. In the chapter the relation 
of the interface and services is mapped. There is also an introduction to VFD configura-
tion and programming. 
Chapter three focuses on the cybersecurity of the Industrial Internet. The chapter in-
cludes categorization of different threats against industrial devices, description of attack 
process against industrial internet systems and description of the industrial network 
from the VFD point of view. In addition, this chapter presents mitigation techniques for 
the industrial devices against attacks. 
Chapter four describes how the case study was performed. The chapter starts by describ-
ing different threat modelling practices. First sub-chapter of chapter describes the re-
2 
search approach. After the research approach comes the process description. Process de-
scription presents the method how the study was performed and what was needed to 
take into account in the process. In addition, the chapter describes the method how the 
threat mitigation strategies were prioritised. The chapter describes prioritisation method 
Weighted Shortest Job First. 
The fifth chapter introduces the results of the performed threat modelling. Assets of 
VFD are presented as well as a study of which of the mitigation strategies presented in 
chapter three the VFD is supporting. Attacks discovered against the VFD during the 
threat modelling process are presented. Finally the chapter gives recommendations how 
to improve cybersecurity of VFD. The recommendations are organized in a prioritized 
list.   
Finally, the last chapter is a conclusion chapter. It wraps together the research what have 
been done for the thesis. It also proposes actions for the future 
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2. VARIABLE-FREQUENCY DRIVE 
Variable-frequency drives (VFD) are devices which control the speed and torque of Al-
ternating Current (AC) motors. Because of a VFD, motor runs always in the right speed 
and torque. The function of VFDs is to enable continuous control of motors. Figure 1 
presents an example of VFD product family. 
A motor without a VFD is connected straight to a power-distribution network. This kind 
of usage is called direct on line usage. Thus, it runs at the network's frequency. It means 
that the motor runs at a nominal speed. If motor is not supposed to run at a full speed, it 
has to be braked, choked or gears have to be used to control speed of motor. Those prac-
tices consume a lot of energy. VFD saves energy by using only necessary amount of 
electric power to run a motor.  
Beside of the energy savings and continuous controlling VFD also advances the accura-
cy of motor movement. For example, VFD in an elevator enables a smooth start and 
stop for the ride. Without the VFD, the elevator ride starts with a jump and stops in the 
same manner. 
 
Figure 1. Variable-frequency drives (ABB, 2016). 
 
4 
Running an AC motor is not the only application where VFDs are used. VFD works in 
opposite direction as well which means that they can transform energy into electricity in 
a frequency that is suitable for a power-distribution network. Thus, the VFD can work 
with a generator. Wind power is an example of creating energy and converting it into 
the right frequency for the power-distribution network. Advanced VFDs can also trans-
form braking energy into electricity. Otherwise energy is transformed into heat. This 
kind of function is useful for example for cranes.  
30-40 percent of newly installed motors have VFD installed with them (Lendermann et 
al. 2011). Hence, VFDs are taken in to use at steady pace. In addition, VFDs can be tak-
en in to use for older motors, so the amount of VFDs might be larger than 30-40 per-
cent. 
VFDs are used in different fields, for example, paper, oil and food industries. Washing 
machines and similar household devices use VFDs too. However, in this thesis focus is 
on industrial usage, mechanical engineering and building automation. Thus, the focus of 
the thesis is on paper mills, steel mills, oil refineries, etc. The industrial VFDs work in 
the same manner than its smaller variants. The biggest difference is that in industry mo-
tors are bigger and there are more of them, so industrial VFDs need to be more reliable 
because delays might be expensive in the industrial process. In addition, it can be costly 
to replace or repair industrial purpose VFDs.  There are also other devices in the same 
network with VFD. In industry motors working in cooperation should work in the same 
pace and should hold the right position. It means that there needs to be communication 
between VFDs concerning motors and states. 
Lifetime of VFDs are long. If devices are used in good conditions, variable-frequency 
drives' operating time can be as long as decades. Some VFDs from 80’s are still in use. 
Thus, there is a large base of old VFDs installed because of long lifecycle. Hence, many 
VFDs are manufactured before no one thought that someone might want to compromise 
VFDs. 
2.1 Configuration of VFD and IEC 61131-3 programming 
VFD’s have a lot of configuration items. For example, ABB’s ACS880 has 33 different 
parameter groups. However, VFD does not need that much parameters configured to run 
a motor. Large amount of parameters enables precise control of VFD in various situa-
tions. ACS880 has a feature called parameter lock. It can lock parameters and prevent 
users to change them. The lock is protected by four digits password. The lock can be 
opened from the PC tool and fieldbus. The tools are described in the next subchapter. 
There is a possibility to program some higher performance VFDs. There are two ways 
to program them, Adaptive Programming (AP) and other programming methods which 
are presented at International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61131-3 standard for 
programmable logic controllers. There are also macros which are set of parameter 
groups for common use cases like, pump application or fan. AP can be used when set-
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ting parameters is not enough but user wants to change parameters when the input 
changes (ABB, 2016). In addition, IEC 61131-3 programming allows users to create 
own applications too. IEC programming includes five different programming lan-
guages: Ladder Diagram, Instruction List, Function Block Diagram, Structured Text and 
Sequential Function Chart. 
2.2 Interfaces 
This sub-chapter describes common interfaces of VFDs. VFDs have input and output 
interfaces, which are used to control and monitor them. The interfaces are described in 
the Table 1 below. The VFD’s interfaces are fieldbus, Safety option, Memory unit, 
Drive to Drive link, PC tools, panel, I/O and SD card. The Table presents a short sum-
mary of every interface. In addition, the sub-chapter explains wider fieldbus and panel 
interfaces. Common fieldbus protocol Modbus and Profinet are also presented. 
Name Explanation 
Fieldbus There are different fieldbus option modules available. So VFD can be 
connected by various protocols. Fieldbus is used to link various field de-
vices to PLC 
Safety option Safety option is an option module, which listens to I/O. Safety options are 
used to ensure safety of machines. When the safety receives a signal or 
cannot get signals from the source, it shutdowns the VFD in a controlled 
way. 
Memory unit Memory unit works as a storage for firmware software, applications and 
files. Thus, memory unit can be used for loading a new firmware and ap-
plication. 
Drive to Drive 
link 
Implements master/slave architecture connection between VFDs. It is 
used to link several VFDs together; an example usage case is where mo-
tors are coupled together, like via conveyor belt. 
PC tools There are different kind of PC tools for controlling, parameter configura-
tion and creating IEC 61131-3 applications for VFD. Also new firmware 
can be loaded through a PC tool. PC can be connected to VFD through 
Ethernet cable. 
Panel Panel works as user interface for the local user. There are also Bluetooth 
panels available, which allows to configure VFD from the smart phone.  
I/O There are two types of I/O signals, analogue and digital. 
SD Card SD Cards are auxiliary memory, which enables transfering firmware up-
date, user data and user’s programs from PC to VFD and vice versa. 
Table 1. VFD Interfaces (ABB – Firmware manual, 2016) 
Fieldbus options offers different protocols for the communication with the PLC and 
other devices in the industrial network. VFDs support many protocols including, but not 
limited to, BACnet/Ip, CANopen and Modbus TCP. Wide spread and the de facto pro-
tocol of fieldbus communication is Modbus (Knapp 2011, p. 56; Drury 2009, p. 508). 
The protocol has been developed as early as 1979 and TCP/IP version of Modbus was 
developed at 1999. Sundell et al. (2012, p. 17) are presenting that many of fieldbus pro-
tocols are applying master-slave architecture. Also Modbus is using master-slave mech-
anisms in communication. Responsibility of configuration and running the system is re-
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lying on a master which can be either Supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) control system or PLC. 
Field devices are working in real-time environment and, thus, those protocols need to be 
efficient. This means that the protocols do not contain any unnecessary functions. 
Hence, security features, like authentication and encryption are not supported by proto-
cols. (Knapp 2011, p. 55.)  
Modbus works at the seventh layer, which is application layer, of OSI model. The OSI 
model is presented at the sub-chapter 3.2. Working in the application layer means, that 
the protocol is not depending on the communications protocols under the application 
layer. Thus, it can operate in serial networks and also in TCP/IP network. The Modbus 
protocol uses message broadcasting to send a message to device. The correct device is 
selected based on a unique address, thus, every device gets a message but only correct 
one will answer. The security concerns of Modbus protocol are lack of authentication, 
lack of encryption, broadcasting of messages, programmability and lack of message 
checksums in Modbus TCP (Knapp 2011, p. 56-60). 
Profibus is another protocol supported by VFD. The protocol can be used as asynchro-
nous, synchronic messaging and also over ethernet. The protocol works as a master-
slave architecture like Modbus, but the difference is that there can be multiple master 
nodes. The master has a token which is used to control certain slaves. The master is 
changed by token sharing. The possible cybersecurity weaknesses of the protocol are 
lack of authentication, token capturing by malicious person and false token injection. 
(Knapp 2011, p. 80.) 
The panel is connected to VFD through RS-485 connection. The panel has a user inter-
face and user can change VFD’s parameter settings through it. There is also an USB in-
terface in the panel. The USB port can be recognized in figure 2 in the bottom of panel. 
The USB port can be used to connect local PC to VFD. Some versions of the panel al-
low also a Bluetooth connection. The Bluetooth connection is established by allowing 
Bluetooth connection from the panel. Hence, the panel generates a four digit pairing 
number. Thus, the devices with Bluetooth capability can be connected to VFD. The 
range of Bluetooth depends from the devices class and can vary from 10 to 100 meters 
(Wright, 2018).  
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Figure 2. VFD panel (ABB, 2011) 
2.3 Interfaces and services  
Different internal services of VFDs are presented in the Table 2. The Table presents 
VFDs’ services and relation of them to different entry points. The Table shows that PC 
tools have the widest access to different VFD’s services, which makes it the most criti-
cal component from a VFD’s point of view if attacker wants to download malicious ap-
plications or perform other malicious actions against VFD’s services. In addition, the 
Table shows that fieldbus have access to VFD’s parameters. Thus, an attacker can also 
change parameters through it. However, there are parameters which can prevent 
fieldbus, panel and PC usage of VFD. 
service Fieldbus Safety 
option 
Memory 
unit 
Drive 
to 
drive 
PC 
tools 
Panel I/O SD Card 
Writing para-
meters 
X   X X X   
Reading pa-
rameters 
X X  X X X   
Time services X   X X X   
File system 
services 
    X X  X 
Load a new 
application 
  X  X    
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Load a new 
firmware 
X X 
 Save 
drive configu-
ration / 
backup 
    X X   
Load a new 
software li-
cense 
  X  X    
Drive control X X  X X X X  
Drive referen-
ce 
X   X X X X  
Drive monito-
ring 
X X  X X X X X 
Table 2.  Table about different services and interfaces 
Writing parameters is a service for handling parameters of VFD. The parameters are an 
important part of VFD’s configuration. More about the configuration and parameters is 
presented at the sub-chapter 2.1. Four interfaces are allowed to write the parameters. 
Those interfaces are fieldbus, Drive to Drive link, PC tools and panel.  
Time services is a service for setting an internal clock of VFD. The clock is used for 
balance VFD’s real-time clock. It is used, for example, in the logging showing current 
time for the user. The time services are also used for synchronization of Fieldbus com-
munication.  Interfaces for accessing to time services are: fieldbus, Drive to Drive link, 
PC tools and panel.  
File system services is a service for accessing VFD’s file system. It includes modifica-
tion of files, removing files and adding new files. Three interfaces have an access to the 
services: PC tools, panel and SD card. Although, SD card is used only to store data. 
Load a new application is a service for loading a new application. Applications are pre-
sented in the sub-chapter 2.1. Memory unit and PC tools are allowed to load a new ap-
plication.  
Load a new firmware is a service for updating or changing VFD’s firmware. Firmware 
is a critical part of VFD and only PC tools and Memory unit have an access to load a 
new firmware. 
Save VFD configuration / backup is a service for saving VFD’s configuration. Backup 
can be used to copy parameter set to different VFD. Thus, replacing VFD doesn’t take 
effort of configuration of parameters. Panel and PC tools can be used for backupping 
VFD. 
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Load a new software license is a service for loading a new software license. The license 
allows VFD to upgrade its firmware. Memory unit and PC tools are capable to updating 
VFD’s license. 
VFD control is a service to controlling VFD. It includes start and stop of VFD and the 
motor it runs. Fieldbus, Safety option, Drive to Drive, PC tools, panel and I/O have an 
access to controlling VFD. 
VFD reference is a service to change a reference value of VFD. Reference value deter-
mines the speed of motor which is run by VFD. Fieldbus, Drive to Drive, PC tools, pan-
el and I/O have an access to controlling VFD. 
VFD monitoring is a service for monitoring VFD functionality. It includes reading VFD 
reference and notifications which are affecting to usage of VFD. Also data about the 
load of the motor and its affects of VFD functionality. All the interfaces have an ability 
to monitoring VFD’s functionality. 
2.4 Variable-frequency drive as a part of industrial network 
Figure 3 presents an example how the industrial network can be built. There are pro-
grammable logic controllers (PLC), which are computers designed for working in the 
industrial environments. Thus, those are robust computers which can operate real-time 
environment. PLCs are used for controlling industrial automation process like assembly 
line and robotics. VFDs are connected to PLCs by a fieldbus, for example. There are 
two kind of VFDs in the Figure 3. The smaller VFDs are located to the right from the 
local PC at the bottom of Figure. The boxes to the left of the same local PC are larger 
VFDs, which are called cabinet-build drives.  
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Figure 3. Industrial network in the VFD point of view (ABB, 2016) 
 
There can also be a local computer, which has programs to configure VFDs, in the in-
dustrial network. The PC programs have an ability to modify and update parameters of 
VFDs and monitor them. The Table 2 in the sub-chapter 2.3 showed, that PC have a 
widest access privileges to VFD’s services through PC tools, if those are not disabled by 
configuration parameters. 
Figure 3 shows also that there are two VFDs linked together by Drive-to-Drive link, 
which is a black line in the center of the Figure 3.  In the Drive-to-Drive link one device 
works as a master device and another device works as a slave unit. Another black line in 
the Figure presents a connection between a panel and a local PC. There is a possibility 
to connect a local PC to VFD’s panel through USB interface and configure the VFD. 
Figure 3 presents also that there are firewalls for separating the operational network, 
where the VFDs are, from the Internet. Messages in the public network are secured by 
cryptography. There are different solutions, for example, https and virtual private net-
works (VPN), which are used to secure connections. Although, when there are possibili-
ties to connect to VFDs and other industrial devices from internet, it makes VPNs an at-
tractive target for attackers (Sundell et al. 2012).  
Figure 3 presents a cloud service also. Manufacturers have started to collect data from 
VFDs all over the world. Those VFDs are used in different conditions and environ-
ments. For example, it can help manufacturers to forecast maintenance need of VFDs. 
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3. CYBERSECURITY OF INDUSTRIAL INTERNET 
Computer security is for protecting valuable things called assets. According to Pfleeger 
et al. (2015, p. 2), content, i.e. data, is the thing which makes a computer unique and 
valuable for its user. Data is an asset but there are also more assets in embedded systems 
than there are in personal computer security. For example, functions which embedded 
system enables are an asset for the user. Another asset of industrial devices is safety. It 
is critical that devices work correctly and do not cause danger to its users and other peo-
ple by working unexpectedly. Thus, some bug in the program code might change de-
vice's behavior and the whole system in a critical moment which could even cost lives. 
Attacker might want to compromise the functionality of the system and produce damag-
es to people or the system. In other words, ensuring safety of the systems and cyberse-
curity are strongly tied together. 
3.1 Terms and definitions of cybersecurity 
There are a couple of terms which are essential to cybersecurity and need to be defined. 
A security flaw means a weakness in the system, which a possible attacker can exploit. 
Attacker's access to a flaw and a capability to exploit the flaw forms a vulnerability. 
Computer bug means a system's unintended or unexpected action based on intended use. 
Bugs mainly arise from the systems design or errors made by a programmer. Threat 
means a set of circumstances that could cause harm. (Pfleeger et al. 2015) Bugs can 
cause security flaws. 
There are also a couple of terms in the thesis which should be explained to prevent con-
fusion. Thesis’ essential term industrial system references to the production systems 
which include devices used for production.  
According to Techopedia (2017) and Industrial Internet Consortium (2017) Industrial 
Internet is combination of devices and intelligent data. In this thesis the term Industrial 
Internet is used in the same manner as organizations’ operational network. 
3.2 Communication in industrial Internet 
Communication has a critical role in industrial networks. Real-time devices must work 
together and keep the same pace. Thus, communication between devices is in a critical 
role when complicated functions are concerned. There are different methods how the 
communication can be established. Operational network may include devices, like field 
devices, fieldbuses, control computers, etc. Thus, there are different kind of devices 
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from multiple vendors. Devices communicate with each other by either fieldbus proto-
cols or Ethernet. 
The communication between devices can be abstracted, for example, Open Systems In-
terconnection model (OSI) is a conceptual model for abstracting communication func-
tions. The model is composed of seven layers and each of the layer has its own purpose. 
For example, Figure 4 shows the path a message has to travel to another device’s appli-
cation layer. Message has to travel through each layer, from Application Layer to the 
bottom of the model, which is called Physical Layer. Then the message has to continue 
in Physical Layer to another device's Physical Layer, and from there to Application 
Layer. What is notable is that in the model’s designing phase in the late 1970s, no layer 
took cybersecurity explicitly into account (Sundell et al. 2012). This is why layers do 
not have security built in and because of that other layers do not ensure correctness of 
other layers’ messages. Thus, attack might happen in any level of the model and com-
promise upper levels. For example, if attacker changes destination address of messages 
then the messages cannot get to Application Layer (Sundell et al. 2012). Thus, software 
architects and designers should take the OSI model into account and notice that com-
munication happens in all the seven levels in the model. Designers should answer the 
question which layer or layers need more protection. Adding security features might 
cause performance costs. (IIC, 2015.) Thus, VFD designers need to take account per-
formance costs for VFD when adding security features to communication. VFDs are re-
al-time machines, hence, the latency cannot be significant. 
Data link layer
Network layer
Transport layer
Physical layer
Session layer
Presentation layer
Application 
layer
Data link layer
Network layer
Transport layer
Physical layer
Session layer
Presentation layer
Application 
layer
 
Figure 4. OSI model 
3.3 Threats to industrial network 
The number of security threats against networked devices are increasing. Especially 
possible attackers got new set of attack tools from an attack tool leak of CIA (MacAskill 
et al. 2017). An industrial networks’ connectivity to the internet enables malicious peo-
ple to attack remotely against a network and its devices. Although, as Stuxnet case 
showed, the attacker does not even have to have a remote access to the target system but 
corrupted USB stick can also spread viruses, for being an example of virus spreading 
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without networks. More about Stuxnet’s attack against an Iranian nuclear power plant is 
presented in the end of the sub-chapter.  
Common threats for machine-to-machine communication are divided into six catego-
ries. Those threats apply for the industrial network devices: 
1. Physical attacks which includes manipulated devices, booting with fraudulent or 
modified software. 
2. Compromise of credentials includes attacks against authentication algorithms, 
tokens, token cloning.  
3. Configuration attacks includes fraudulent software updates, misconfiguration. 
4. Protocol attacks includes modification of protocol messages. 
5. Attacks on the core network includes attacks against routers. 
6. User data and identity privacy attacks includes stealth of credentials. 
(Cha et al. 2009.) 
The list shows that there are various threats for which industrial operators and device 
manufacturers need to prepare. Manufacturers of VFD can prepare to the points Physi-
cal attacks, Compromise of credentials and Protocol attacks. While industrial operators 
need to protect their factories against attacks on the core network and user data and 
identity privacy attacks. Defending from the configuration attacks is responsibility of 
both manufacturer and operator.   
Importance of the industrial networks’ security has been noted in the Industrial Internet 
Consortium (IIC) too. IIC have taken cybersecurity into account in their Industrial Net-
work Reference Architecture publication. According to IIC (2015, p. 24), “The en-
forcement of security policies requires the ability to control various endpoints and their 
communication involved in an activity in a generic and consistent way to ensure com-
plete end-to-end coverage.” IIC presents also four principles how to prevent cyberat-
tacks and prepare for them in a big picture. Security monitoring gathers and analyses se-
curity-related data continuously as activities are performed. It may take different forms 
depending on the context of operations and on security events. Security policy manage-
ment manages both automated and human-driven administrative security tasks by doc-
umenting their usage and constraints. Security auditing “collects, stores and analyses 
security information related to IIS”. Cryptographic support management consist of 
globally interoperable key management, secure credential storage and revocation. (IIC, 
2015, p. 24.)  
Sundell et al. (2012) recognize two major threats for the field devices of industrial net-
work. Those threats are information leakage and tampering of devices. There are mainly 
three channels for information leakage. Leakage can happen through an IT leak, human 
leak or physical leak. Leakages might happen anywhere from device manufacturer’s 
production line to devices' employment place. Tampering of device can happen in two 
different ways. An attacker can insert spoofed firmware updates or change device pa-
rameters through the control PC or device’s user interface. There are reasons why an at-
tacker wants to change field devices firmware. An attacker might want to either cause 
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malfunction to device or improve performance of device. Improved performance of de-
vices brings a threat to device manufacturer in a form of money loss. Less capable de-
vices are priced cheaper than top models. In some cases the hardware and device in 
cheaper models are the same as in expensive models. In other words, some features are 
disabled in the cheaper models by the software. (Sundell et al. 2012.) Thus, a device 
owner may get more features than they have paid for by modifying the device.  
A well-known example of an attack against an industrial facility is the Stuxnet case. 
Stuxnet was an advanced computer worm targeted at nuclear plant of Iran. The facility’s 
network did not have access to the internet. Regardless that there was not access to in-
ternet, the virus spread to the system through a contaminated USB memory stick. The 
code of Stuxnet was written so that it affected only computers, which had a Siemens’ 
Step7 software installed. Step7 is a program for controlling Programmable Logic Con-
troller (PLC) which commands VFDs. VFDs steered motors which controlled centrifug-
es. First Stuxnet disabled alarms. Then it changed PLC's commands for its own mali-
cious commands. Finally those malicious commands broke approximately 1000 to 2000 
centrifuges according to estimates. (Zetter, 2011.) 
3.4 Attack process against Industrial system 
Before an attacker can perform malicious actions to the system, they need to perform 
certain steps to break into the system. It is critical to recognize the methods attackers 
use and how they apply them for implementing functioning mitigation strategies. In-
fosec Institute proposes seven steps of how successful cyber-attack can be performed: 
1. Reconnaissance 
2. Scanning 
3. Access and Escalation 
4. Exfiltration 
5. Sustainment 
6. Assault 
7. Obfuscation (Infosec Institute, 2015.) 
Reconnaissance. At first, the attacker identifies the vulnerable targets. Those targets can 
be persons from all over the target organization including admins or chief executive of-
ficer. The attacker needs just a single point of entrance to get started. A common meth-
od to gain access is to use different phishing techniques. (Infosec Institute, 2015). At-
tacker can also gain information from the organization structure and its workforce from 
the company’s website and social media. With deeper knowledge of a target organiza-
tion it is easier for attacker to launch an attack and gain an access to organization’s net-
work. 
Scanning. After the attacker has achieved access to organization’s network, attacker can 
start to scan weaknesses. There are different tools available in the internet which can be 
used to detect weaknesses. This phase of the process might take some time. If the in-
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truders are not detected they can spend a long time gathering private data, monitoring 
communication and mapping the network. (Infosec Institute, 2015.) If the attacker has 
access to organization’s file system, a good practice might be using honey pot defend-
ing. The network’s admin creates an attractive target for attacker to check. For example, 
folder with name next year’s budget might attract attacker to check. After the attacker 
enters to the folder, the honey pot program notifies admin that somebody has visited in 
the folder. Thus, the network admin can investigate if someone is in the network who 
should not be there.   
Access and Escalation. When the weaknesses in the network have been identified, starts 
the third phase: access and escalation. The phase includes obtaining wider privileges. 
Thus, attacker can move around more freely in the environment. Attacker’s goal is to 
gain admin privileges. (Infosec Institute, 2015.) 
Exfiltration. When an attacker gains admin privileges, attacker “owns” the network. 
Now the attacker has access to sensitive data. It is called exfiltration phase. An intruder 
can steal private data with the admin’s wider privileges. Attacker can also perform ma-
licious actions, like change or erase files. (Infosec Institute, 2015.)  
Sustainment. After the attacker has achieved access with full privileges, starts sustain-
ment phase. It means the attacker stays in the network quietly and monitors the actions 
of the network. Attacker might install rootkit viruses which make attacker's return to the 
network and systems easy. Thus, attacker can return as frequently as they want. Because 
of rootkits or other malicious actions, attacker does not have dependence on a single ac-
cess point anymore. (Infosec Institute, 2015.) 
Assault. Sixth step is assault. Fortunately this step is not taken to use in every attack. In 
the assault phase attacker modifies target system and attacks against hardware. An at-
tacker might disable hardware entirely as well. In this phase attacker comes visible and 
stops being invisible. Unfortunately attacker has taken control over the system, so de-
fending the system in this phase might be late. (Infosec Institute, 2015.) Although, best 
practice might be to run the system down and plug it out from the internet. 
Obfuscation. After assault phase comes the last step, obfuscation. Attacker wants to 
hide their tracks and confuse the victim’s examination process of the attack. Log clean-
ing, misinformation, zombie accounts are tools that attackers are using for hiding their 
tracks. (Infosec Institute, 2015.) 
3.5 Mitigation of threats in the endpoint devices 
Previous chapters showed that there are many different types of threats against industri-
al systems. The chapters described also a process how an attacker performs an attack. 
Manufacturers can reduce security risks by creating a mitigation strategy. Industrial In-
ternet Consortium has listed methods on how to strengthen the security of devices. 
Threat mitigations have focused on the industrial networks and their endpoints like, for 
example, VFDs. 
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Industrial Internet Consortium proposes good practices to mitigate threats against Indus-
trial Internet devices in their Industrial Internet Reference Architecture (2015, p. 50-56):  
- Secure Boot Attestation 
- Separation of Security Agent 
- Endpoint Identity 
- Endpoint Attack Response 
- Remote Policy Management 
- Logging and Event Management 
- Application Sandboxing 
- Application Whitelisting 
- Network Whitelisting 
- Endpoint and Configuration Control 
- Dynamically Deployed Countermeasures 
- Remote and Automated Endpoint Updates 
- Policy Orchestration Across Multiple Endpoints 
- Peripheral Devices Management 
- Endpoint Storage Management 
- Access Control 
Secure Boot Attestation is a practice which says that device must start from a known se-
cure state and prevent modification of boot sequence. If the boot sequence is modified 
unexpectedly, boot system should fail. Failure actions should depend on a security poli-
cy. Reporting of failure can be implemented by secure agent. (IIC 2015, p. 51.)  
Security Agent is a software that monitors the device. For instance, anti-virus programs 
are security agents. Security agents have various features for keeping device secure. 
One feature is logging and event monitoring. It means that every violation of permission 
leaves a trace. Also user login/logout, data access, configuration changes, application 
execution and communication are archived in a log. (IIC 2015, p. 51.) The Separation 
of Security Agent is in this context a practice that the security agent is separated from 
the other processes and other processes cannot influence it. IIC (2015, p. 51) lists four 
different methods to separate the security agent: Process-based separation, container-
based separation, virtualization-based separation and gateway based separation. The se-
curity agent works as a separate process in process-based separation. Container-based 
separation is a practice where the security agent is separated in the own module which 
might have an own processor and capabilities for secure memory. Virtualization-based 
separation means that there are own virtualized operating system for the security agent. 
Gateway-based separation is practice where the cybersecurity functions in the different 
device than the target device. The device works as a proxy for the network traffic. (IIC, 
2015, p. 51.)  
Endpoint Identity means that every device in the industrial network should have an own 
unique identity. IP, MAC and Bluetooth addresses are used to identify devices. Alt-
hough, those addresses are easy to change and thus, are easy to fake by an attacker. A 
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better way to identify a device is to have a cryptographic key to ensure genuineness of 
the credentials. Hardware is needed to prevent leakages of keys as well. Having a 
unique identifier also eases authentication of devices. (IIC 2015, p. 52.) Thus, this prac-
tice might require the burning of a cryptographic key in the hardware. 
Endpoint Attack Response is a practice when the device is under an attack, it should de-
fend itself, report the attack and response to attack based on the security policy. Also, 
devices should recognize when their peer device is compromised and report it to a secu-
rity management system. (IIC 2015, p. 52.) 
Remote Policy Management is a procedure to keep devices’ security policy configura-
tion and functions updated. Central security management system should control the de-
vices’ security policy and transfer changes to devices. Security agent is used to authen-
ticate and put into action the security policy in the device. (IIC 2015, p. 52.) 
Logging and Event Monitoring is a practice for monitoring and recording events in an 
endpoint. Events like, security violations, user login or logout, data access, configura-
tion update, application execute and communication should leave a mark into logs. (IIC 
2015, p. 53.) In addition, it should be noted that attacker might want to prevent being 
noticed by changing logs, like the attack process’ last phase obfuscation mentioned. 
Application Sandboxing is a practice where endpoint devices applications have own 
separated environment. Applications have limited access to the system resources. Thus, 
the application cannot damage the system. On the other hand, isolating the application 
from the system resources, might prevent usage of important resources. (Rouse, 2012.) 
Application Whitelisting and Network Whitelisting are practices where only certain ap-
plications or network addresses are allowed. Other connections or applications are ter-
minated. Whitelists are used to allow scripts, binaries, and libraries in the device. Thus, 
only certified programs are able to run. Programs which are not allowed to run are ter-
minated and it should leave a mark to the log. (IIC 2015, p. 53.) 
Endpoint and Configuration Control is a practice to prevent unauthorized changes to 
endpoints configuration.  
Dynamically Deployed Countermeasures means that security management system 
should have a capability to create new countermeasures to prevent attacking (IIC 2015, 
p. 53).  
Remote and Automated Endpoint Update is for having the most recent security updates 
in the machine always. Updates must be automated and performed by a trusted security 
agent via a secured process. Updates of firmware must be authorized beforehand by a 
security management system to prevent attackers from installing malicious firmware 
updates. (IIC 2015, p. 53.) The practice might require sign of the update packages to en-
suring that the update packages are not tampered. 
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Policy Orchestration Across Multiple Endpoints is practice to coordinate security policy 
across multiple devices. It enables secure workflow between devices. (IIC 2015, p. 54.) 
Peripheral devices management means an auxiliary device's controlling policy. USB 
sticks and such constitute as peripheral devices. Peripheral devices should have their 
own security policy. Violation to security policy, for example when a peripheral device 
is disconnected, means that the device is compromised. (IIC, 2015.) The practice means 
that when the new modules are connected, the device should ensure that it is not mali-
ciously tampered module. 
Endpoint Storage Management is a practice to secure data of a device. Whitelists can be 
used to check which applications or users have access to device’s data. Storage man-
agement includes files integrity monitoring and encryption of data and software also. 
Data loss should be prevented and policy violations should be alerted. (IIC 2015, p. 54.) 
Access Control is a practice for controlling who and what can control device. It is based 
on a security policy and let only allowed users to use a device. Access Control should 
alert security management system for unauthorized access attempts. (IIC 2015, p. 54.) It 
should be thought carefully who have the right to reset the user’s password. Resetting 
the password should not be too easy to prevent an attacker to guess a password reset 
questions. For example, governor Palin’s personal email was stolen by using email’s re-
set functionality and the attacker found answers to reset questions from the internet 
(Zetter, 08). 
In addition, a practice which is not in the mitigation strategy list is hardening or system 
hardening. It is a set of practices to increase device’s security. Hardening means that all 
the programs which are not used, default passwords, unnecessary services and 
usernames are disabled. Hardening includes removing unnecessary applications, deny-
ing file sharing between programs and using encryption where possible. (Techopedia, 
2017.) The hardening should be performed when the devices are moved from the testing 
and development phase to production.  
A good practice for ensuring code level security is to have code reviews. Code reviews 
for whole code might be too costly, thus threat model can guide to make reviews for the 
parts of software which are ranked most vulnerable (OWASP, 2016). Hence, all the ef-
fort for making software more secure is directed towards most vulnerable areas. 
Now the mitigation strategies of devices have been dealt. Although, even if a device is 
secured, threats might rise from the network itself, so the network needs securing too. 
Next the thesis will proceed to network security 
3.6 Threat mitigation in the Industrial network 
Device's security also includes communication security. After the mitigations of the 
previous chapter are performed device is not completely secured. There can be PLC and 
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PC that control VFDs in the industrial network, and if network is compromised, an at-
tacker can get control over the devices. Thus, it is also important to secure the network. 
If the network is insecure, there are methods to increase communication security. Indus-
trial Internet Consortium (2015, p. 55) proposes the following practices to mitigate se-
curity risks in communication: 
- Mutual Authentication Between Endpoints 
- Communication Authorization 
- Identity Proxy/ Consolidation Point 
- User Authentication and Authorization 
- Encryption in Communication 
Mutual Authentication Between Endpoints ensures that data is not leaked to unknown 
parties but communication happens between authenticated parties. In the other hand, au-
thentication might be a too costly function for some smaller devices, like sensors. In 
these cases it is recommended to use lightweight authentication. (IIC 2015, p. 56.) With 
authentication malicious devices or entities cannot get control over the device without 
proper credentials. 
Communication Authorization should happen after authentication. It means that when 
the opposite is authenticated, certain resources are allowed for authenticated party based 
on the opposite’s permissions and security policy. (IIC 2015, p. 56.) Best practice is to 
give user enough resources to perform necessary tasks and hide all unnecessary features 
and data-accesses. 
Identity Proxy / Consolidation Point can be used for old industrial network devices to 
perform secure gateways. Identity proxy can also be used for old protocols and devices 
which do not support authentication otherwise. (IIC, 2015.) Thus, proxy servers can add 
security to the industrial system, if the network traffic are cycled through it. Having an 
authentication to older devices is not the only advantages of proxy. It can also log activ-
ities of the device. Thus, proxy can also collect logs about the network traffic.  
In addition to previous practices, which are focused to the communication between de-
vices, User Authentication and Authorization is recommended practice also. Based on a 
combination of user information and access device’s information can be formed a 
unique access profile. (IIC, 2015.) Thus, security policy can define where and when us-
ers are allowed to access to devices. 
Encryption in Communication is a practice to secure communication from outsiders by 
encrypting the communication messages (IIC 2017, p. 56). 
3.7 Attacker profiling 
It is useful to know what kind of people or organizations might threaten VFDs. First 
step in profiling an attacker is to find the motivation of attackers. Attackers' motivation 
depends on the usage and location of VFD. Like described in chapter three, VFDs are 
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used in industrial environments in this thesis, so attacker might want to steal process 
knowledge or they might want to sabotage the processes somehow, for example. 
There are different types of attackers which are listed in Table 3. Even national agencies 
are believed to sometimes want to harm devices. For example, Stuxnet is believed pro-
duced by governments (Zetter, 11). 
According to IBM X-Force® Research report (2016), number of cyber-attacks has de-
creased a little but at the same time attacks have become more sophisticated. More pro-
fessional attacks may indicate that organized crime has taken growing interest in cyber-
crime. Organized crime wants to profit from the attacks by, for example, blackmailing 
companies by threatening them with attacks to their factories and production processes. 
 Resources Motivation 
Script kiddies low fame, “Can I do it” 
Organized crime  medium / high profit by blackmailing or selling 
information for competitors 
Terrorists medium terror 
National agency high attacking against hostile gov-
ernments, spying 
Table 3. Different attacker types 
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4. CASE STUDY 
The following chapter describes how the case study was performed. The target of the 
case study was Variable-Frequency Drive (VFD), which were presented in the chapter 
2. 
4.1 Research approach  
The study started by finding out the initial status of VFD’s cybersecurity by discussing 
with VFD developers and staff of VFD manufacturer. The result of initial status was 
that not much has not been done for improving cybersecurity of VFDs. In the first study 
we discovered that there was a feature made for locking the VFD parameters. We also 
discovered that the cybersecurity had been a constant and important topic in the discus-
sions after the Stuxnet. Another driver for the improving cybersecurity is a networking 
of devices. It enables a remote attack against VFDs.  
After the state of the cybersecurity of VFDs was studied we started the process to im-
prove the cybersecurity. First we studied the different methods for improving cyberse-
curity. The best method for improving cybersecurity was to find threats by performing 
threat modelling and mitigate threats. So we started to study threat modelling and ended 
up performing attack based threat modelling. A threat modeller should think like an at-
tacker in the attack based threat model. Thus, threats are same as attacks. According to 
Shostack (2014) threat modelling is all about looking security issues in a bigger picture 
by abstracting the system. Saitta et al (2005) adds that threat modelling should examine 
all potential risks of the system and not concentrate only on the place where security 
flaws are predictable. The attack based threat modelling produces attack vectors which 
can be presented in an attack tree form. The whole threat collecting process is presented 
at the sub-chapter 4.2 
After the threats were discovered we started to consider mitigation strategies against 
threats. We discovered a list of threat mitigation practices from Industrial Internet Con-
sortium’s publication: Industrial Internet Reference Architecture. Based on the attacks 
we arranged a workshop for prioritisation of the mitigation strategies. More discussion 
about the prioritisation and prioritisation method is presented in the sub-chapter 4.3. 
4.2 Threat mitigation process description for variable-
frequency drives 
Figure 5 illustrates the thesis’ threat modelling process for VFD. The process is divided 
into three phases: initialisation phase, threat modelling phase and updating phase. The 
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process is based on a discussion with an experienced design manager in a VFD manu-
facturer company. The discussion gave a foundation of the threats and knowledge where 
to start searching for more threats. The design manager suggested that I should discuss 
with the senior developers in charge of the operating system and various internal mod-
ules. Literature supports the idea of discussing threats with various developers 
 
Figure 5. Threat modelling process 
First phase of the process is to initialize threat modelling for VFD. It consists of finding 
VFD's assets. This step requires a person with thorough knowledge of devices, their 
content and usage. In this phase a sketch of an attack tree is created. After the attack tree 
has been created, it is presented to the design manager who gives feedback on it. 
In the second phase of the process, actual threat modelling begins with stakeholder 
meetings. Stakeholders are selected based on their area of expertise. The meetings are 
held one-on-one because the format eases explaining the model to the stakeholders. In 
addition, one-on-one conversation lowers the threshold to propose new ideas; there may 
be some dominant individuals in a group conversation. It leads to a situation where qui-
et people are not willing to present their ideas. At the beginning of each meeting the 
term ‘asset’ is defined and found assets are listed. It is important to properly define the 
terminology before moving the discussion to other topics. Then follows a discussion 
concerning the validity of those assets. Also questions of possibly having more assets 
and whether the already collected threats are valid threats, should be stated at this stage. 
After that the interfaces are presented and explained to developers. It is critical in these 
meetings to achieve a common understanding of the assets, the attack tree graph and 
threats. When the individual interviews are completed, a group interview is held. All the 
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possible attacks were found in the previous meetings are presented in the meeting and 
after that the rest of the meeting should be used discussing and analysing the threats and 
attacks. Benefits of the group interview come from the common understanding of the 
threats and possible attacks. Thus, stakeholders can expand a scope and increase 
knowledge of attacks.  
When the model is ready, actual threat modelling does not stop there. New threats occur 
when the technology evolves. This leads to a situation where the threat model should be 
updated regularly. 
4.3 Prioritisation method of VFD mitigation strategies 
There are some factors which should be taken into account when prioritizing the mitiga-
tion strategies. One prioritization factor is how easy it is to apply these strategies. Does 
implementing the strategies require some kind of special expertise or can those strate-
gies be implemented easily? For example, authentication could be easy to put into prac-
tice but it could demand authentication capability from other devices. Thus, the practice 
might be easy to implement but it does not give full protection if other devices do not 
support it. Another point is the question of what strategies fulfil each other. Does the 
chosen strategy provide support for implementing other strategies? Is it necessary to 
implement strategies in a certain order? 
There are many ways to prioritise mitigation strategies. In this thesis two prioritisation 
methods were considered. First method was Weighted Shortest Job First (WSJF) meth-
od. The second method was to use well known list of attacks to prioritise mitigation 
strategies. For example, this kind of list is an OWASP’s top 10 application security 
risks. 
The newest version of the list is from 2017: 
1. Injection 
2. Broken authentication or session management 
3. Cross-site scripting 
4. Broken access control 
5. Security misconfiguration 
6. Sensitive data-exposure 
7. Insufficient attack protection 
8. Cross-site request forgery 
9. Using components with known vulnerabilities 
10. Unprotected APIs (OWASP, 2017) 
 
The OWASP threats list is focused on web applications. Industrial devices differ from 
web applications by their nature of accessibility and lifecycle. So, top ten attacks are not 
strictly applicable for prioritization of mitigation strategies. Although, the list can give 
24 
hints where to focus development efforts on after basic mitigation strategies are ful-
filled. 
Another prioritisation method WSJF is a simple function to determine prioritization of 
software features. It is calculated by the following formula: 
 
𝑊𝑆𝐽𝐹 =
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
  
 
Business value in the formula describes how much the threat mitigation practice im-
pacts the customer experience. Is there a penalty of delay or other negative impacts for 
manufacturer? Time Criticality means importance of timing when the feature is deliv-
ered. If a feature is delayed, does it cost the customer some potential business value? 
Risk Reduction: Does this reduce risks or does neglecting it affect in a negative way. 
Job Size means how much implementation takes time. Value of Job Size comes from 
comparing different features. For example, story points are good indicators of feature's 
size (Scaled agile framework, 2017). 
WSJF is more suitable for prioritisation in this case than OWASP’s top 10 list. The pri-
oritisation with WSJF needs a wide group of specialists, so the results of prioritisation is 
relevant for VFD manufacturers. 
The chosen method WSJF needed a broad view for development of VFDs and 
knowledge from many stakeholders to be more effective. Thus, we needed to organize a 
workshop for prioritising the mitigation strategies. The workshop’s invitations were sent 
by email and the location was VFD manufacturer’s meeting room. The invitation mail 
included short description of WSJF method and list of mitigation strategies to be priori-
tised. The stakeholders were selected from different units and area of expertise. There 
were product managers from different usage fields of VFD, developers and architect. 
Because of a broad expertise of attendees we had the best view of future development of 
VFDs and future customer requirements.  
The workshop was structured as follows: First we agreed prioritisation method, which 
was Weighted Shortest Job First (WSJF) method. The method was already familiar for 
stakeholders so we did not have to spend a lot of time for understanding the prioritisa-
tion method. The method uses Fibonacci series for giving priorities to targets. Thus, we 
agreed in the workshop to use same kind of numbers than there are in Fibonacci series: 
1,2,3,5,8,13,20,30,40 where 40 was highest priority in the Business Value, Time Criti-
cality, Risk Reduction fields whereas 1 was fastest job to perform and 40 most difficult 
to perform in the Job Size field. The numbers were selected because those were includ-
ed in the method. The values are relative to each other and the values does not represent 
any single unit, like a day or a week. First there should be selected a smallest job and 
other items are compared to it and prioritised. The Fibonacci series is good option in the 
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prioritisation of largest numbers because the numbers are further apart, hence, it is easi-
er to give values for jobs between numbers 13 and 21 than deciding between numbers 
13 and 14 (Brown, 2015). The possible results of the formula are between 0.075 and 
120. 
After the method was presented to all of the attendees, we had a short conversation 
about the mitigation strategies. What those practices were, how those affect to security 
and were there requirements for some features already.  
When everything was clear, we started voting. We all had cards where was Fibonacci 
numbers. Then we voted by showing the card at the same time, so that no one would 
copy others’ voting numbers, and that we would get a propriety view of everyone. The 
voting went without confusions. Some of the mitigation strategies lead to discussion 
about the implementation and need of the feature in some specific cases.  
We had reserved an hour to meeting but the beginning of the workshop took so much 
time that we had only time to have a long discussion about the Business Value of every 
item. The two factors: Time Criticality and Risk Reduction we went through without 
deeper discussions. After the Risk Reduction the time was up and values of Job Sizes 
were missing. We agreed that everyone will give their estimates of Job Sizes by email. 
At the end we had only two answers of Job Size by email. The Job Size values are aver-
age of the two answers. 
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5. RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results from the case study. The results are presented in the 
same order that the findings were found during the threat mitigation process. Hence, 
first the assets of VFD are presented. Availability of interfaces are discussed after the 
assets sub-chapter. The attacks against VFD are presented in sub-chapter 5.3. After it 
the results of the study of VFD’s mitigation strategies are presented. After the mitiga-
tion strategies the not applied mitigation strategies are arranged by the results of work-
shop. Finally discussion ends the chapter. 
5.1 Assets 
Threat modelling started by finding what is needed to protect, i.e., which are the assets 
of the VFD. The recognised assets are presented in the Table 4 
Name Explanation 
VFD works like expected VFD works in full capacity and the way it is 
configured 
Intellectual Property VFD does not leak information to competi-
tors. This also includes manufacturers’ intel-
lectual property. 
Safety Related to the asset of the “VFD works like 
expected” but emphasizes VFD’s functionali-
ty in the failure cases and cases where harm 
can happen to humans. 
Legislation Trading agreements do not allow to export 
VFDs to countries which might use them in 
military purposes, like in process to enrich 
uranium for nuclear weapons. 
Table 4. Assets of VFDs 
The study recognized four assets concerning the VFD. The main asset is that VFD 
works like expected. It means that VFD is configured properly by instructions of a 
manufacturer. In addition, VFD obeys commands which it gets from the user. Thus, the 
asset is strongly related to the safety asset. Safety asset means that VFD should not 
cause any damage to humans. For example, if repairer is performing maintenance inside 
a machine, machine cannot start unexpectedly.   
Legislation can be an asset also. Selling VFDs that have a capability to enrich uranium 
to countries which might have an interest to develop nuclear weapons is restricted by 
trading agreements. For example, United States have set restrictions of potential mili-
tary-use items exporting to North Korea (Noland, 2004). 
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Intellectual property asset means that VFD does not leak any information to outsiders. 
The asset includes also intellectual property of a manufacturer. For example, how 
VFD’s torque control is designed is an intellectual property which VFD manufacturers 
want to keep secret. 
5.2 Availability of interfaces 
Availability is in critical role when malicious persons are trying to achieve their goal of 
compromising VFD. The best defence method has been for a long time isolating pro-
duction environment from the organization’s information network and from the internet. 
Because that situation is changing, and users can have a remote access to production 
environment from organizations’ network, attackers might be capable of attacking re-
motely against VFDs. Isolating VFD and industrial network makes attacking against 
them more difficult. On the other hand, computer worms can spread to the industrial 
network though they are isolated. For example, the Stuxnet worm spread to the isolated 
environment. 
A considerable thing in availability is whether the attack needs physical access to a de-
vice or can attacks be generated remotely. For example, if an attacker wants to just stop 
VFD and motors, there are many different interfaces, which allow to stop motor or dis-
turb its functionality. For example, modification of encoder I/O signal can modify con-
trol of the VFD except, this requires physical access to cables between motor and VFD. 
However, if the attacker can achieve a physical access to devices, there have been secu-
rity weaknesses in the organization access control. 
5.3 Attack tree 
An attack tree is a form to present attack vectors. The attack tree is presented in the Fig-
ure 6. The attack tree is based on discussions with stakeholders and their perceptions 
about weaknesses of VFD and potential attacks which might threaten VFD. There are 
connections between different elements in the attack tree. However, in this thesis it was 
difficult to present how the attacks proceed because the attacks were possible to be per-
formed through multiple different interfaces. Thus, the interfaces box is abstracted to 
include all the interfaces. 
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Figure 6. Attack tree 
First level of the attack tree is assets, which were presented in the sub-chapter 5.1. Be-
low the assets level is a services level. VFD’s services and their interface access are pre-
sented in the sub-chapter 2.3. There are VFD’s interfaces represented below the services 
box. Lowest boxes of the tree describe attacks against VFD. The attacks are presented 
later and every attack has its own dedicated table for describing it. 
The services and interfaces row describes what kind of setup enables attacks. For exam-
ple, if an attacker wants to stop VFD, they can use any interface which has a capability 
to prevent VFD running in order to launch an attack. More sophisticated attacks, for ex-
ample, logic bombs need a certain route, like modification of firmware or controlling 
local PC. 
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Content of assets, services and interfaces boxes of the Figure 6 are expanded in the Fig-
ures 7, 8 and 9. The Figure which included all the attacks, interfaces, services and assets 
was too wide to presented as in one figure, thus the attack tree is simplified by abstract-
ing Interfaces, services and assets. The assets are listed in the Figure 7. The Figure 8 
presents services which were listed in the sub-chapter 2.3. VFD’s interfaces, which 
were listed in the sub-chapter 2.2, is presented in the Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 7. Assets of VFD 
 
Figure 8. Services of VFD 
 
Figure 9. Interfaces of VFD 
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5.4 Attacks 
Attacks which were found in the discussions with the stakeholders are presented in the 
tables below. The list is not all-inclusive but it presents all of the attack vectors this 
group of subject-matter experts identified during one round of threat modelling. The list 
should be updated constantly when new threats are found, if manufacturers want to keep 
their VFDs secure.  
The found attacks are listed in the Table 5. The Table have different fields describing at-
tacks. Fields are: Category, What, Why, How, Difficulty and Severity. Table’s row 
what is the attack’s name. Table’s row why answers the question why attacker might 
want to attack in the described manner for the certain component. It describes also what 
an attacker can possible benefit from the attack. Table’s row how describes how the at-
tack might be performed. It describes also what attacker needs to take into account 
while attacking. Table’s row difficulty gives an estimate how difficult the attack is to 
perform. Table’s row severity is estimation how effective succeed attack might be. 
Number three is broadest impact and number one is lowest impact. Some of the rows 
are left to blank because those rows might need the knowledge of different kind of ex-
perts which were not available while the attacks were discussed and invented. 
The category row maps attacks to the categories which are presented in the chapter 3.3. 
The categories are: Physical attacks, Compromise of credentials, Configuration attacks, 
Protocol attacks, Attacks on the core network, User data and identity privacy attacks. 
Categories are used to detect which parts of the system are more vulnerable than other 
parts 
Category Compromise of credentials 
What Eavesdropping 
Why Competitor might get data about machine utili-
zation and the production processes. Also at-
tacker can take control of VFD if message pro-
tocol is easy to study. 
How Attacker gains an access to a network and lis-
tens VFD’s messages. 
Difficulty 1. Messages are not encrypted so listening is 
easy. Most difficult factor in the attack is to 
gain an access to the network. 
Severity 3 
 
Category Compromise of credentials 
What Man-in-the-middle 
Why Attacker wants to compromise a VFD or de-
vices which are depending on VFD. Attacker 
can also take control of VFD. 
How Attacker have investigated the VFD’s messag-
ing protocol and places a computer into middle 
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of communication link of VFD and device 
which is controlling VFD. Thus, attacker can 
either prevent messages from VFD to control-
ler and opposite. Attacker can also send fake 
messages to both of devices and create con-
fusion and malfunction to operator. 
Difficulty 2. Messages are not encrypted so listening of 
messages is not difficult. Most difficult factor in 
the attack is to gain an access to the network. 
Severity 3. Depending on the quality of credentials. 
 
Category Configuration attack 
What Modification of speed ramps 
Why Attacker wants to damage devices which are 
run by VFD.   
How There are parameters for setting speed ramps 
and limits. Manipulating them can remove 
speed ramps. 
Difficulty 1. If parameters are not locked, it is easy to 
delete speed ramps by fieldbus or PC tools. 
Severity 2. 
 
Category Configuration attack 
What Attacker changes firmware for his/her own. 
Why Attacker can launch attack at the worst mo-
ment and cause damage. Attacker can also 
use this to collect information about competi-
tor. 
How - 
Difficulty 3. Attacker should have a lot of knowledge 
about VFD’s internal processes.  For example, 
target VFD consist of three parts and the parts 
need a correct license key to work together. 
Getting the license keys might be difficult. 
Severity 3 
 
Category Configuration attack 
What Attacker changes firmware to older version 
with known bugs 
Why Attacker can damage the process 
How Attacker changes firmware version to older 
which has the known bugs and utilizes bugs to 
harm process of target user. 
Difficulty 3 
Severity 1 
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Category Configuration attack 
What Attacker breaks VFD licensing system 
Why Attacker wants more features or higher power 
output. 
How Attacker breaks into VFD licensing system and 
copies the higher level license to cheaper 
units to get more features. 
Difficulty 2 
Severity 1 
 
Category Configuration attack 
What Attacker changes panel or other auxiliary de-
vice for his own. 
Why Attacker wants to have a control over a de-
vice. For example, panel is easy to change 
and it has wide service access. Thus, attacker 
can use panel to collect information about the 
usage of VFD. 
How Attacker must reverse engineer an auxiliary 
device’s firmware and study the protocol which 
is used to communicate with VFD. 
Difficulty 2. There is a parameter value for disabling 
panel or fieldbus control. Thus, properly confi-
gured VFD can be protected against attacks. 
Severity 3 
 
Category Configuration attacks 
What Attacker can copy a VFD application and use 
it for other VFDs 
Why VFD’s applications are allowed only paying 
customers. 
How The applications are distributed by flash sticks. 
An attacker copies flash stick to computer 
memory and creates a new stick from copy. 
Difficulty 2 
Severity 2 
 
Category Protocol attack 
What Denial of service 
Why Paralyzing a production process. 
How Attacker sends a constant flood of messages 
to VFD trying to paralyze it. 
Difficulty 1. Attacker needs an access to the industrial 
network where VFD is located. Denial of ser-
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vice tools for PC are available in the internet, 
so the biggest difficulty comes from getting an 
access to network 
Severity 2 
 
Category Attacks on the core network 
What Leakage of R&D tools 
Why R&D tools have capability to read and write to 
every memory slot of the VFD if the feature is 
not disabled from the parameters. 
How Attacker bribe manufacture’s R&D workers to 
get the program or try to steal repairer’s PC. 
Difficulty 2 
Severity 3 
 
Category User data and identity privacy attack 
What Stealing the backup files 
Why Backups store VFD parameters. For example, 
attacker might want to calculate production 
volume or map the organizations process to 
copy it. 
How Attacker might get backups from careless dis-
tribution of the backups. 
Difficulty 1 
Severity 2 
 
Category Legislation 
What Dual-use 
Why Exporting VFDs, which can be used for mili-
tary use purposes, like enriching uranium, to 
some countries is denied by international trad-
ing agreements.  
How Attacker needs a correct license to enable 
VFD’s dual-use feature. The correct license 
can be stolen from VFD which supports fre-
quency of dual-use. 
Difficulty 2 
Severity 2 
Table 5. Attacks against VFD 
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5.5 Description of mitigation strategies in VFD context 
This sub-chapter describes the mitigation strategies and how those strategies can be ap-
plied into the VFD. 
Separation of security agent is a practice in VFD context where a single module called 
security agent is separated from other code. It means that the security agent is hardened 
and there is not an easy way for an attacker to disable security agent or disturb it. This 
practice can be produced by creating a new container-based separation and older VFDs 
can be protected by gateway based separation. Although, Gateway-based separation 
have a weakness if the attacker have an access to the device. Hence, attacker can bypass 
the security agent by just connecting straight to VFD through panel or other interface. 
Endpoint Identity is a strategy where VFD recognizes other devices in the network. The 
strategy is essential for authorization. VFD’s communication process is a master-slave 
method, which gives full control to master. Thus, it is critical to know who is a master. 
IP, MAC and Bluetooth addresses can be used for the identifiers but those can be 
spoofed. 
Remote Policy Management could be, in a VFD context, a central program or a cloud 
service which updates VFD’s security agent to deal with new threats when new threats 
occur. Although, the identification of cloud service or a central program must be se-
cured by authentication and messages are needed to be encrypted because if a malicious 
person can perform man-in-the-middle attack, that person can inject malicious code to 
VFD. 
Logging and Event Management is a strategy to store data about user actions, parameter 
change, configuration change and new IEC 61131-3 programs. By logging it is easy to 
track what went wrong and later investigate attack path if attacks happen. It can also 
help VFD developers in debugging computer bugs. With endpoint identity practice can 
be tracked where the attacker accessed to the VFD. 
Application Sandboxing can mean that if users have an opportunity to create own appli-
cations, its functionality is limited to a sandbox. VFD can be programmed by IEC 
61131-3 programming languages and application sandboxing can limit certain function-
ality of the languages.  
Endpoint and Configuration Control to prevent unauthorized change to the endpoints. 
This practice was fulfilled by the parameter lock. It prevents an unauthorized person, 
which is a person who are not allowed to access to the system, to change the parameters 
of VFD.  
Dynamically Deployed Countermeasures means that VFD can alert security system that 
it is under attack and create new counter measures against attacks.  
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Remote and Automated Endpoint Update is a strategy for updating operating system and 
programs of VFD remotely. 
Peripheral Devices Management. VFD have external options like panel and different 
option modules like safety module. The strategy means that the option modules must be 
authenticated with the VFD. The strategy prevents a usage of a modified panel. Thus, 
for implementing this strategy peripheral devices need to have a signature which should 
be verified from a VFD every time when a device is plugged in. 
Endpoint Storage Management means taking care of the integrity and encryption of da-
ta. In the VFD’s context it can mean encrypting file system, encrypting IEC 61131-3 
applications, encryption of backups. 
Access Control in VFD means that only authorized users are allowed to use it. The ac-
cess control can be performed by password, for example. There are a couple of access 
control practices taken in use at VFD. User lock prevents unauthorized users to change 
the passwords. There are also parameters which can exclude connection types like 
fieldbus and Bluetooth connections and those parameters can also disable some PC 
tools which are used for debugging.   
Mutual Authentication between Endpoints means that VFD can recognise other parties 
in the network and authenticates with them. This is practically setting authentication 
protocols and credentials for authentication. It might be a good practice to implement 
this feature in the security agent. 
Communication Authorization means in VFD context that only recognized parties can 
communicate with VFD. When the opposite is recognized, VFD can provide certain re-
sources which are allowed to the opposite. 
Identity Proxy/ Consolidation point practice can be taken in use if the VFDs are spread 
in the different locations, for example, VFDs which are not in the same network. Thus, 
the communication between VFD’s which does not support the encryption of messages 
can have encryption, if the proxy is responsible of sending the communication messag-
es. The proxy can implement higher cybersecurity standards in communication than 
VFD. With the practice security-gateway can be produced (IIC 2015, p. 56). 
User Authentication and Authorization is a practice where user is identified. Depending 
on user access level user can either change parameters get access to other VFD’s ser-
vices. 
Encryption Communication is a practice where messages between VFD and other com-
munication parties are encrypted. Without encryption the attackers can produce eaves-
dropping attack easily and study what kind of communication happens between VFD 
and other industrial Internet devices. On the other hand, encrypting and decrypting 
might be a costly process for the field devices calculating power. Those devices might 
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not have efficient processors to encrypt and decrypt messages and work in the real-time 
at the same moment. 
5.6 Applying mitigation strategies for VFDs 
The sub-chapters 3.5 and 3.6 described different threat mitigation strategies that could 
be applied to industrial network devices, such as VFDs. The sub-chapter 5.5 described 
what those strategies mean in VFD’s context. This chapter maps which mitigation strat-
egies are already applied in the VFDs. Based on this review it is later possible to sug-
gest new strategies to be worth of considering what it comes to increasing the security 
of VFDs. 
The Table 6 presents which mitigation strategies are being used in VFDs, both to the 
device itself and its network communication. The Table consists of mitigation strategies 
presented in sub-chapter 3.5 and 3.6. 
Mitigation strategy: Yes No 
Secure Boot X  
Separation of Security Agent  X 
Endpoint Identity X  
Remote Policy Management  X 
Logging and Event Management  X 
Application Sandboxing  X 
Application Whitelisting  X 
Endpoint and Configuration Control  X  
Dynamically Deployed Countermeasures  X 
Remote and Automated Endpoint Update X  
Peripheral Devices Management  X 
Endpoint Storage Management  X 
Access Control  X 
Mutual Authentication Between Endpoints  X 
Communication Authorization  X 
Identity Proxy/ Consolidation point  X 
User Authentication and Authorization  X 
Encryption Communication  X 
Table 6.  Applied mitigation strategies of VFDs 
As the Table 6 shows, there are a couple of strategies being applied. The applied strate-
gies were Secure Boot, Endpoint Identity and Remote and Automated Endpoint Update. 
Although, the secure boot strategy is applied, it could be enhanced to give better protec-
tion by burning crypto key to the hardware. Varghese and Bose (2014) suggest that 
making boot more secure can be accomplished by burning bootloader firmware image 
into embedded controller. Thus, encryption key is embedded to the hardware and cannot 
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be changed. This enables secure boot and can get rid of hardware tampering. Hence, pre 
bootloader can be secured also. 
Access control requirement was partly satisfied by user lock. User lock locked the 
VFD’s parameters from change by password. In addition, Bluetooth connection can be 
denied, writing to file system can be denied and running the adaptive programming pro-
grams can denied too. 
The Table 6 shows also that the assumption of the introduction that security of VFD has 
count upon isolation of the environment is true. Therefore more mitigation strategies are 
not taken in use. Some of the strategies are not directly applied for the VFD or need 
support for other devices of industrial Internet. For example, Identity Proxy / Consolida-
tion Point is probably an easiest strategy to add security to communication between 
VFDs and other devices of industrial Internet. Although, identity proxy does not remove 
a weaknesses of an actual device. Thus, an attacker who can get physical access to de-
vice can cause harm in the same manner than earlier. 
The messages of VFD are sent with no encryption and VFD does not identify the re-
ceiver. Messages over internet are encrypted in turn. Thus, attacker can more easily at-
tack against communication of industrial network. In addition, sub-chapter 2.2 dis-
cussed that common industrial protocols, which VFDs are using, do not support authen-
tication. Hence, it gives an easier ground for attacker to perform malicious actions. Un-
encrypted and not authenticated devices removes attack phase 3 from the attack process 
of sub-chapter 3.4. Attacker does not need to get privileges, if attacker can get access to 
network.  
5.7 Prioritized mitigation list 
The result of performed mitigation strategy prioritisation meeting is presented in the 
Table 7. Mitigation strategies: Security Agent and Separation of Security agent were left 
out of the prioritisation because the mitigation strategies were unclear in the meeting so 
those practices were left without values. In the prioritisation workshop were also a dis-
cussion that the practice Separation of Security Agent needs an implementation of a Se-
curity Agent practice first. Thus, those strategies are inseparable. 
The scale of values start from a value 0,286 and ends to value 11,125. The scale of vot-
ing numbers were in Fibonacchi series but in the workshop some attendees wanted to 
increase importance of some features, thus, there are numbers 21 and 34 in some fields. 
Mitigation: Business  
Value 
Time  
Criticality 
Risk  
Reduction 
Job Size Value 
Security Agent - - - - - 
Separation of Security Agent - - - - - 
Endpoint Identity 13 5 5 5 4,6 
Logging and Event Management 13 20 20 5 10,6 
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Application Sandboxing 3 5 5 13 2 
Application Whitelisting 2 5 5 8 0,875 
Dynamically Deployed Countermeasures 1 5 5 21 0,286 
Peripheral Devices Management 13 5 13 13 2,385 
Endpoint Storage Management 8 5 5 8 2,25 
Access Control 21 34 34 8 11,125 
Mutual Authentication between Endpoints 13 13 5 13 2,385 
Communication Authorization 21 5 5 8 3,875 
Identity Proxy/ Consolidation Point 8 5 20 5 6,6 
User Authentication and Authorization 21 40 40 13 7,769 
Encryption Communication 8 5 5 8 2,25 
Table 7. Prioritised mitigation strategies 
The access control turn out to be a priority number one based on values of the Table 7. 
The practice got 11,125 points from the WSJF formula. Next significant feature was a 
Logging and Event Management with the points 10,6. Third practice to implemented 
was User Authentication and Authorization. The User Authentication and Authorization 
was requested by some customers, thus, Time Criticality and Business Value were high 
for the feature. There were also requirements for the Access Control so it got high val-
ues too. 
The strategy which got lowest points was Dynamically Deployed Countermeasures. 
Second lowest value was for Application Whitelisting. Dynamically Deployed Coun-
termeasures were seen as a little confusing practice and attendees of prioritisation work-
shop did not recognize as much business value for it than in other practices. Notable is 
that Application Whitelisting and Application Sandboxing got low points in business 
value also. Thus, the practices which are most likely to focus internal operations of 
VFD are not seen as important as cybersecurity features which are related to network-
ing. The results can be explained by the expertise of the workshop attendees. The prod-
uct managers listen customer requirements and customers have more focus on the whole 
network security. Then the focus is not as much in the internal security of VFD than it 
might be with the developers of operating system of VFD. 
5.8 Discussion 
The thesis got started from a requirement that business unit of a large manufacturer 
must perform a threat modelling for its product. The business unit’s product is VFD so   
the thesis started with the goal to perform a threat modelling for VFD. Basics of threat 
modelling were found from Olli Penttilä’s master thesis, which focused threat model-
ling in maritime container terminal automation systems (Penttilä, 2016). 
After the attacks were collected, the thoughts about the threat modelling changed. The 
initial goal was to increase security of VFDs but the collected attacks did not answer to 
the need. Thus, answer to need was to apply mitigation strategies. The found attacks 
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were useful for selecting mitigation strategies to the thesis. The attacks gave a hint 
which mitigation strategies were relevant against the know attacks. 
During the attack collecting phase it was noticed that it is difficult to give a certain 
numbers for attack’s severity or difficulty to prioritise them. Initial idea of the catego-
ries was to categorize attacks if those can be performed remotely or do attacks need a 
physical access to device. Thus, many of found attacks were difficult to categorize be-
cause of there were many ways to perform them. The idea of categories were discarded 
because many of the attacks could be performed remotely through different devices and 
using protocols or with physical access to device. Hence, categorizing attacks to remote 
and physical access attacks did not have any value. 
The thesis got a newer form when the Industrial Internet Consortium’s Reference Archi-
tecture publication was found. There were taken into account the cybersecurity of In-
dustrial Internet device and mitigation strategies for threats. The publication created a 
base of enhancing cybersecurity of VFDs. Thus, the thesis can be criticized for relying 
too much for the one publication. Although, the mitigation strategies of Reference Ar-
chitecture are reasonable and source is trusted though source is not the easy to under-
stand. The presented mitigation strategies are basic strategies which are good to be im-
plemented before more advanced practices. For example, cryptography is mandatory 
practice in the web applications. Hence, the message encrypting might be better imple-
ment before the buffer overflows of operating system. If the messages are not encrypted 
an attacker does not have to study operating system vulnerabilities but an attacker can 
take control of VFD only by studying networking protocols and using them against 
VFD. 
The number of found attacks in the thesis was enough for the thesis scope, but for the 
developing more secure VFDs it might be good idea for implementing the mitigation 
strategies and after the implementation to take a look which attacks are still valid. Then 
it is a good time to perform threat modelling again with deeper knowledge of VFD. A 
subsequent threat modelling exercise might guide to implement more advanced practic-
es.  
Software developers from a VFD manufacturer were interviewed in the attack collecting 
phase. Thus, the view of threats is a quite succinct. Wider view of threats might be 
achieved by interviewing cybersecurity specialists. Although, cybersecurity experts are 
not likely to have as good knowledge of VFD as developers of VFD but they might 
have a deeper knowledge of industrial network and the protocols. Also the security is as 
strong as the weakest link of the chain, it is also recommended to have a threat model-
ling for the full network where VFDs are operating for gaining a better protection. 
The thesis prioritization method Weighted Shortest Job First (WSJF) can be criticized 
from the emphasis of Job Size. Even though if the Business Value, Time Criticality and 
Risk Reduction have a high values, partitioning by high value of Job Size directs work-
ing towards jobs with smaller divisors. Hence, the smallest job is more likely to be a 
most important job. 
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The result of prioritization can be criticized about the Job Size. There were only two an-
swers considering the values of them and the values were received by email. Thus, the 
deeper discussion of job sizes were missing. Hence, we can argue that the Job Size does 
not describe the situation. On the other hand, the prioritisation of Job Size would be 
more realistic if there have been developers in the prioritisation workshop. The at-
tendees of workshop were only business people, so the insights focused more on the 
business value of different strategies. On the other hand, values of Job Size cannot be as 
accurate as values in Business Value, Time Criticality and Risk Reduction because of 
Job Size cannot be accurate if the practice has not divided into tasks. The size of tasks 
can be estimated and then the Job Size can be estimated based on the mitigation strate-
gy’s tasks sizes.  
Perhaps the most difficult issue in the prioritisation workshop was to achieve a common 
understanding of different mitigation strategies and what those strategies meant in the 
VFD context. Thus, some of practices might have been a little unclear in the prioritisa-
tion workshop. Better preparations for workshop would give better results but the work-
shop was needed to arrange under short notice time because of attendees were busy and 
there were confusion in the meeting invitations.  
It is important to notice that mitigation strategies which are presented in the thesis are 
just a beginning and the strategies will not give a full protection against attackers. More 
likely the strategies gives basic protection for VFDs and, thus, might lead attackers to 
attack against VFD through other devices in the organization network. In addition, it has 
to be notified that there are devices which use old protocols in the same networks with 
VFDs, hence, transition to use newer more secure protocols might take a longer time 
depending on the other devices in the network and support of those devices. 
Another important aspect in the implementation is that target devices are working in re-
al-time, thus, those do not have possibility to perform expensive calculations. Also re-
sources of the VFDs are limited, hence, it might be difficult to implement most sophis-
ticated features. The life cycle of VFD’s are long, thus, it is impossible to forecast what 
kind of threats VFDs can face in the future. Hence, practices which ease to updating the 
VFD’s cybersecurity remotely is important. 
Results of the thesis were what was expected. There has not been done much in protect-
ing VFD’s against cyberattacks. The protection against attackers have been dealt with 
by the guards and locks this far. Thus, the thesis gives a good recommendations about 
where to focus development efforts next. However, manufacturers are not probably go-
ing to improve cybersecurity of their devices if clients does not require the cybersecuri-
ty features. However, having a good cybersecurity might give a competitive advantages 
against competitors. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The thesis focused on the cybersecurity of industrial Internet devices. The study was 
performed as a case study and the target device was variable-frequency drive (VFD). So 
far industrial devices have been protected by guards and locks. Those protection meth-
ods are not enough when the devices are connected to internet. Thus, manufacturers of 
devices like VFD need to take cybersecurity into account. 
VFD is a device which is used to steer AC motors. So, VFDs can be used in different 
applications like running assembly belt, pumps, and elevators. Some VFDs in the indus-
trial network have options to access in cloud services on the internet.  
The thesis introduced cybersecurity in the industrial Internet. There was also presented a 
classification of threats. The cybersecurity included descriptions of threat mitigation 
strategies for devices and communication in the industrial Internet. In addition, the the-
sis showed that there are different parties who might have an interest in attacking VFDs.  
The thesis describes the process of how the cybersecurity of VFDs was studied and how 
the thesis ended up to the results. The prioritisation method was Weighted Shortest Job 
First (WSJF). WSJF was chosen for prioritisation because of its familiarity for stake-
holders and its capability to collect wide views of priorities from different stakeholders. 
The study included also collection of attacks against VFD. The thesis presented VFD’s 
assets, which are: VFD works like expected, intellectual property, safety and legislation.  
Availability of interfaces was discussed and VFD’s assets were presented also in the 
thesis. The study of threat mitigation strategies and application of them in VFDs was 
performed. Thus, the not applied strategies were prioritised in the stakeholder meeting 
by giving WSJF value for each of them. 
Man-in-the-Middle attack and other attacks related to communication between devices 
were found during the study. However, the attacks were not in the focus of this thesis 
but adding better protection for VFDs. In the study we noticed that there was a protec-
tion for VFD’s parameters by enabling password protected parameter locking. In addi-
tion, there was a few threat mitigation strategies already applied. The strategies were: 
Secure Boot, Endpoint and Configuration Control and Remote and Automated Endpoint 
Update.  
There was a workshop for prioritising not applied mitigation strategies. The workshop’s 
attendees were VFD manufacturer’s staff with position ranking from product managers 
to software architect. The result of workshop was a prioritised threat mitigation list. The 
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list guides how the manufacturers can improve cybersecurity of their devices and which 
strategies have been seen more important to increase cybersecurity than others. 
The top three mitigation strategies in the prioritised list were Access Control, Logging 
and Event Management and User Authentication and Authorization. These strategies 
were selected as the most important ones because using the WSJF technique gave high-
est scores for them. These three strategies got highest points especially in the business 
value. It was so because majority of people in the prioritisation workshop were business 
people. Thus, the mitigation strategies were prioritised mainly in the business point of 
view. There was an indication that customers want certain features, thus, the features 
got the most points in the prioritisation method.  
The thesis proposes, as the next step, to implement the mitigation strategies first and af-
ter the practices are implemented the next step can be a subsequent threat modelling of 
the VFD. Thus, the later threat modelling would give a hint where to focus cybersecuri-
ty enhancement efforts next. 
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